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I. Introduction
Everybody dies. But if death is like taxation in being inevitable, it is also like taxation
in that its most vexing questions are about how and when, rather than whether, it will occur.
Nowadays, most people die in hospitals;1 most people die of chronic illness;2 and most people
are subject to medical intervention that may postpone the time and alter the manner of their
3
deaths. Not all such alteration is inevitably seen as salutary. Many terminally ill patients

suffer, and they may see various medical interventions as prolonging, or even intensifying,
that suffering. That such perceptions are commonplace has given rise to ample public
concern about the role of the medical profession in alleviating the suffering of the dying and,
incidentally, a vast body of literature on death and dying. Two of the most striking issues
∗
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See 2A NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VITAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992, tbl.1-30, at 374-79 (1996), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/mort92_2a.pdf (reporting places of death in the U.S. for 1992).
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See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997, at 97 (1997)
(representing deaths by age and leading cause for 1994), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/97statab/vitstat.pdf.
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See Louis Lasagna, The Prognosis of Death, in THE DYING PATIENT, at 68 (Orville G. Brim, Jr. et al., eds.,
1970).
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presented by the medicalization of death are those surrounding the refusal of life-sustaining
treatment and physician-assisted suicide (PAS).
Attempts to establish a constitutional right to PAS on due process and equal protection
grounds were repudiated by the Supreme Court in the last decade, casting the debate back into
the states.4 There, the debate over PAS continues apace. Recently, for example, United
States Attorney General John Ashcroft has been advocating that Oregon physicians practicing
PAS pursuant to Oregon’s “Death with Dignity Act” are in violation of the federal Controlled
Substances Act.5 In May 2004, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit rejected the Attorney General’s position as unenforceable.6 Further litigation
regarding the Oregon Act is not unlikely.7
Although the literature addressing medical decisions at the end of life is vast,
surprisingly little of that commentary has come from the perspective of law and economics.
That is odd, both because of the large body of economic literature regarding health care
generally and because of the stark costs and benefits entailed by any legal constraints on
medical decisions at the end of life.8 At stake are, on the one hand, questions of individual
autonomy with respect to some of life’s most desperate and personal decisions and, on the
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See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2004).
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See id. at 1131.
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Immediately following the panel ruling, the Justice Department reported that they were reviewing the ruling
and that no determination had yet been made as to the government’s next step. See Blaine Harden, Court Rules
on Aided Suicide, WASH. POST, May 27, 2004, at A2.
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See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REV.
941 (1963) (early discussion of economics and health care).
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other hand, some of our most universal and well entrenched norms prohibiting the willful
taking of human life, norms that surely represent at least useful heuristics for maximizing
social welfare.9
Not all is silence, however. Notably, Judge Richard Posner has offered a sort of costbenefit analysis favoring the legalization of PAS.10 Despite Posner’s signal position of
influence as a jurist and a scholar, his discussion has been substantially ignored in the
ongoing PAS debate.11 This is in some respects understandable. For one thing, Posner’s
critique of the extant policy literature tends to be broad but quick. In places, his analysis of
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At least, but not at most. Such norms may be viewed variously, both with regard to their etiology and with
regard to their generality. For example, on a Kantian scheme we might see them as necessary and exceptionless
rules for rational human conduct. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (H.J. Paton trans, London 1948) (outlining Kant’s moral theory). Nothing in the argument that follows
depends on a very particular account of social or moral norms. How one counts norms here may be up for grabs
as well. I’m considering at least two: the general norm against intentionally taking the life of another (save,
perhaps, in self-defense or in wartime) and the more specific norm prevalent in the medical profession against a
doctor’s participation in PAS.
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RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995) (concentrating on the issue especially in Chapter 10,
Euthanasia and Geronticide). Posner talks about balancing costs and benefits in the most general sense
appropriate to social welfare analysis; that is, abstracting from particular methodological commitments that
come with particular approaches to cost-benefit analysis as practiced in the agencies, he is interested in the most
basic of economic questions we can ask of any policy: what will it get us and at what cost?
Of course, to argue the benefits of legalized PAS via costs and benefits might seem worse than a bad
joke. It has often been observed that medical expenditures at the end of life are substantial, even as the
economic implications of those expenditures have been found by many to be unclear. See, e.g., Seanda Coppa,
Futile Care: Confronting the High Costs of Dying, 26 J. NURSING ADMIN. 18 (1997) (discussing the great
monetary costs of “futile care for the dying”). But cf H.L. Lipton, Medical Care in the Last Year of Life: A
Review of Economic and Social Issues, 1 COMPREHENSIVE GERONTOLOGY 89 (1987) (arguing that conclusions
regarding overconsumption of medical care at the end of life may be at least premature). That it is likely
cheaper to kill people than keep them alive—however one cabins the domain of terminally ill candidates for
PAS—appears at once obvious and impertinent. But however obvious that calculus, it is not what Posner has in
mind. On the other hand, this balance is not irrelevant to Posner’s larger attempt at calculation. See POSNER,
supra, at 244 (suggesting that the cost of keeping terminal patients alive is—to the extent borne by the public—a
legitimate third-party cost in the larger analysis, although a cost made tentative by the question whether (and,
presumably, to what extent) legalization of PAS might tend to promote or suppress the frequency of suicide).
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For a recent example of the debate in the courts, see Oregon v. Ashcroft. 368 F.3d 1118, 1121-23 (9th Cir.
2004).
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topics already the loci of much debate may appear exceedingly casual.12 But at bottom, I
believe that Posner’s discussion is often overlooked because of a mistake about the type of
economic—or law-and-economic—explanation he has on offer. On its face, Posner’s
discussion seems to offer a broad—albeit not comprehensive—canvas of the various costs
and benefits that the adoption of a particular legal regime permissive of PAS would, or
should, entail. The ensuing social welfare calculus considers truly diverse phenomena in turn,
without the benefit of a developed pragmatic means of limiting the cost-benefit problem
space.
I believe that Posner has something more in mind. At the heart of his account is a
model of PAS legalization as a sort of technological innovation. What this particular
innovation brings is a radical reduction in certain critical information costs attending end-oflife decision making. In brief, the promise of assisted suicide is said to provide a wait-andsee window for desperate decision makers, a window in which critical uncertainties are likely
to be resolved. To the extent that the information costs imposed by such uncertainties are the
crux of the problem, the innovation represents a real breakthrough. More generally, Posner’s
is an account according to which a single, relatively simple economic aspect of some change
in legal regime is held to be clear, univocal, and dominant. Posner’s model of PAS thus
looks—at least implicitly—to constitute a sort of end run around the messy business of
assessing the very disparate costs and benefits many think to be implicated in the PAS debate.
In brief, Posner thinks little of the oft-discussed social costs of PAS, so he does not need to
count them against the benefits he anticipates; these are, that legalized PAS may: (a) reduce
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I shall argue some of these limitations below, although I am mostly concerned to discuss the model that seems
to me to be at the heart of Posner’s discussion.
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the absolute number of suicides; (b) reduce (costly) uncertainty and anxiety regarding
contemplated suicides; (c) improve the self-selection of suicides; and (d) reduce the costs
entailed by those suicides that are carried out.
Posner’s discussion is worth attention for several reasons. For one thing, Posner may
be right, at least of some, that “the opponents of physician-assisted suicide underestimate the
benefits and exaggerate the costs.”13 Moreover, Posner’s focus on information and
uncertainty are well placed, as questions regarding decision making under uncertainty are
central in end-of-life care generally. Posner’s model—for all its limitations—does not
obscure these issues; it helps to make them clear. More interesting still, I think, is the
promise implicit in some of the conceptual tools Posner brings to bear on PAS, a promise
only partly fulfilled in Posner’s own discussion.
In this article, I want to take up three issues raised by Posner’s discussion. First, I
want to consider Posner’s model of one particular legalization scheme seen as a sort of
technological innovation. That model frames, in a useful way, some of the central problems
posed by consideration of PAS as a case of decision making under conditions of radical
uncertainty (for the individual at one level and for the state at another). I shall argue that
Posner’s model is incomplete. The problem is not that the information gains suggested by
Posner’s model are ephemeral. Rather, it is that for typical patients they are too small, and
too incrementally realized, to make a critical difference. Legalization of PAS is not likely to
remove the fundamental uncertainties attending end-of-life decision making and it is not
likely to provide benefits adequate to offset the myriad costs considered in the familiar policy
debate. Recasting the model, I shall argue that certain biases implicit in such decision making
13

See POSNER, supra note 10, at 243.
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suggest an answer rather different from the one Posner advocates; that is, I have in mind an
argument on behalf of what is, in almost all the states, the status quo.14
Second, I want to consider generally the question of applying some sort of bounded
cost-benefit analysis to the deeply fragmented policy debate over PAS. I shall argue that a
general solution to the problems posed by PAS is not forthcoming via cost-benefit analysis.
Considering such analysis is useful, all the same, when applied to implementation-level
problems within the PAS debate.15
Third, I want to discuss the normative framework within which the PAS debate does
or ought to occur. That is, I want to consider the baseline assumptions against which we
should evaluate arguments for redrawing the legal rules regarding PAS. To do so involves
answering questions about both the substantive and epistemic standards requisite for certain
sorts of legal norm reform. It will also raise a question about the default standards that should
govern when the project of justifying a change in the status quo proves intractable.
Writ large, the point of this article is to consider, on the one hand, some of the light
economic analysis may shed on the PAS debate and, on the other, certain aspects of the
debate that may not prove amenable to economic solution. At a lower level I seek to do two
things, apart from simple reconsideration of Posner’s extant text. First, I mean to develop an
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Prohibition of PAS takes different forms in the states. Famously, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), one of
the two simultaneously decided Supreme Court cases repudiating claims to a Constitutional right to PAS, began
with a challenge to New York State’s explicit, criminal prohibition of PAS at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(3)
(McKinney 1987). To date, only Oregon has enacted a statute permitting PAS; that is, Oregon’s “Death with
Dignity Act.” OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (1995).
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Although the general notion of implementation may be ubiquitous in the law—consider, for example, the
notion of a statute’s implementing regulations—the theoretical topic of implementation has received little
attention here. A general discussion of this topic would take us far from the subject of this paper. I refer,
however, to the developed cognitive science literature on levels or hierarchies of explanation for complex
systems for the sense of “implementation” I am after. See, e.g., DAVID MARR, VISION (1982); Daniel Gilman,
Optimization and Simplicity: Computational Vision and Biological Explanation, 107 SYNTHESE 293 (1996).
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argument against legalization of PAS that is not predicated on the general notion that suicide,
assisted or otherwise, should be viewed as anathema. There are serious general arguments
against suicide, just as there are serious general arguments for its decriminalization.16 It will
not be part of this article to reject those arguments. I am, simply, arguing to a particular
conclusion based on more broadly acceptable premises; and those are that we should be
extremely chary of state-sponsored killing. At the very least we ought in several respects to
set the bar high when considering putative justifications for enlarging the scope of permissible
killing beyond the established cases of defense, self-defense, and certain limited law
enforcement contexts. In particular, we ought very carefully to scrutinize arguments on
behalf of PAS predicated on the supposed consent of those who are to be killed.
Second, my argument against legalization will both depend on and inform aspects of
the debates over commensurability and risk analysis. Special concerns about interpersonal
valuations of life will lead to special concerns about how to evaluate the inevitable error rate
that would be associated with any of the offered screening filters for PAS. In turn, the sorts
of problems presented by decisions at the end of life may suggest an especially bad case—
perhaps generalizeable—about the familiar proxies offered to ground interpersonal valuations
of life in the larger risk management debate.
The course of my discussion is to be as follows: Section II of this article offers a
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See, e.g., PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 128-29, 140-47 (1979) (arguing that assisted suicide and
“voluntary active euthanasia” are morally permissible under certain circumstances); James Rachels, Active and
Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 78, 78-80 (1975) (criticizing the familiar distinction between
active and passive euthanasia and arguing that active euthanasia may sometimes be morally preferable to passive
euthanasia). But see, e.g., Thomas D. Sullivan, Active and Passive Euthanasia: An Impertinent Distinction?, 3
HUMAN LIFE REV. 40 (1977) (defending the “traditional position” on euthanasia and criticizing Rachels); Daniel
Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 52, 52-55 (contra
euthanasia generally).
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critical analysis of Posner’s general overview of the PAS policy and ethics literature.
Elements of that discussion surface later in the article, but it is not critical to understanding
Posner’s formal model of his legalization scheme, and readers chiefly interested in that
scheme may wish to skip to section II. Section II considers Posner’s model of a proposed
change in legal regime with respect to PAS and his analysis of that model. The model is
found problematic in various regards. Because the benefits to PAS modeled by Posner do not
dominate the costs familiar from the literature, we are left with the question how to account
for those costs in a systematic fashion. I consider one family of such costs, those entailed by
informed consent requirements generally and by ineffective or mistaken consents in
particular. Posner appears to suppose that the problem of devising institutional structures to
guarantee effective consent is trivial. I do not think any such thing, and Section IV discusses
certain biomedical impediments to consent (and to ascertaining consent) among the terminal
elderly, raising a question about inevitable error rates for any contemplated screening
procedure for PAS (including the abridged procedure offered by Posner). Section V then
considers how to figure a cost for such errors in light of the risk management literature
regarding the valuation of human lives. Despite the positive literature regarding risk
management, the project is found to be very likely intractable. Section V also considers other
special categories of third-party costs that might be entailed by the legalization of PAS.
Finally, Section VI concludes by offering a positive account of why difficulties in completing
a social welfare analysis of PAS ought to leave us with something other than just a puzzle.
Considering the general (heuristic) utility of certain moral norms, together with the degree to
which such norms tend to be embedded and the consequent costs of attempting their
modification by legal fiat, it is argued that what is generally the legal status quo should be
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regarded as a strong default position at the least.

II. The (Selected) Costs and Benefits of PAS
Posner’s analysis comes in two parts. First, he proposes a balancing of costs and
benefits meant to favor the legalization of PAS. Second, he offers a quasi-formal, quasiempirical argument on behalf of the suggestion that legalization of PAS may actually serve to
decrease the incidence of PAS. The first analysis is framed by a particular utilitarian
commitment as well as a stipulated restriction on the domain of discourse. That is, Posner—
following J.S. Mill—will count only “tangible harms” to third parties as third party costs.17
As well, Posner’s argument is to apply only to “physician-assisted suicide in cases of severely
disabling and debilitating, usually though not always terminal, illness.”18
Within this framework, Posner considers five factors: (1) the extent to which suicides
may be impulsive;19 (2) the option value of a legal right to PAS;20 (3) the competing (thirdparty?) wishes of family members;21 (4) emotional or psychological illness as distorting
patient volition;22 and (5) the putative social harms entailed by blurring the mission of
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See POSNER, supra note 10, at 238. This is both a defensible and problematic restriction. For now, we’ll note
that, however broad the support for utilitarian theory more generally, this is but one possible version of
utilitarian accounting. Below, we’ll consider how well or poorly Posner cabins “tangible” from intangible third
party harms. See infra pp. 48-57.
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See POSNER, supra note 10, at 237-38.
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See id. at 238.

20

See id. at 239-40.
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See id. at 240.
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See id. at 240.
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physicians.23
I’ll begin with the second factor, as Posner’s argument here makes a straightforward
and worthwhile economic point.24 Posner suggests that the right to PAS has a sort of option
value for seriously ill patients, whether they choose to exercise the right or not.25 I think that
this is correct as far as it goes. That is, I think it likely that there is a non-trivial class of
patients who would derive some positive utility if U.S. law (or the law of their particular
jurisdictions) were to provide legal access to PAS. And I think it psychologically plausible
that some patients would enjoy such a “right” independent of any choice to exercise it.
Reports from Oregon seem to indicate that there are at least some patients who appreciate the
“option value” of the form of PAS available under law there.26 Thus, I think Posner is right to
suggest that legalization of PAS would provide some positive option value that: (a) ought to
be considered in any complete tally of costs and benefits for PAS; and (b) ought to some nonzero extent offset any costs legalization would impose.27 But that is as far as Posner takes it.
There is no attempt to specify the scope of the class of patients for whom some substantial
option value might obtain. And no case is made—à la cost-benefit analysis in the agencies—
for some particular assignment of interpersonal value to that option for that class. Thus,
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See id. at 241-43.

24

I leave aside the third argument altogether as it seems insubstantial at best.

25

See POSNER, supra note 10, at 239.

26

See Linda Ganzini, et al., Physicians’ Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 342 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 557 (2000) (surveying Oregon doctors regarding the practice of PAS, and regarding their own
observations of patient reports); Susan Okie, ‘I Should Die the Way I Want To’: Ore. Doctors, Patients Defend
Threatened Assisted Suicide Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2002, at A1, A6 (reporting interviews with several
Oregon physicians and patients).
27

See POSNER, supra note 10, at 240.
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although Posner has raised an issue worth consideration, he has not begun to answer the
question of how much this limited option value might offset any costs at issue.
Next, I’ll take factors one and four together, as they overlap in Posner’s analysis as
well as my own. According to Posner:
[t]he main nonreligious objection to generally making suicide easier than it is
… is that many suicides are impulsive, the product of a bout of depression,
intense grief or shame, bad news that may be wrong … or other transient
causes that, ex ante, the affected individual might want to prevent from
affecting him. Efforts to discourage such suicides, as by making them more
costly by punishing people who assist in them, can be loosely analogized to the
prohibition of extortion … in which a class of transactions yielding a shortterm gain … is denied legal sanction because the vast majority of people
would consider themselves better off if the occasion for such a transaction
never arose.28
Posner, here, appears to signal a complex of concerns about competence and consent,
uncertainty, and the stability of preferences underlying choices to commit suicide. What’s
useful is the straightforward observation—oft ignored in analyses not grounded in economic
concepts—that legal sanction, however stringent, imposes a cost on a given form of conduct,
a cost that has predictable effects on consumption of that conduct and substitutes for that
conduct.29 Few sanctions are so stringent as to drive consumption to zero.30
In addition, the focus on the putatively transient nature of expressed preferences for
PAS brings together both: (a) concerns about the stability of expressed preferences under
conditions of cognitive and affective impairment; and (b) concerns about the relationship
28

See id. at 238.

29

Of course, this observation has been made elsewhere, not least by Posner himself. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4-5 (3rd ed. 1986); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Neal
Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385 (1997); Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis
in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 344-45 (2004).
30

Murder rates do not tend to be null in the face of even the harshest penalties. And trivially, few legal rights
come with such lavish subsidies as to impose zero costs on consumers of the behaviors those rights guarantee.
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between expressed preferences in the strained and unusual domain of PAS (and end-of-life
decision making generally) and the causal reach of any sort of stable underlying preference
function that is to provide a foundation for such expressed preferences.
What is striking about Posner’s response to these concerns is that it consists of two
wholly analytic arguments. There is no empirical ground, no attempt to assess and balance
actual costs and benefits. The first pass is brief:
A prohibition against assisting suicide cannot be persuasively defended on this
ground in cases in which the person who wants to end his life is incapable of
doing so. The condition that makes it infeasible for the individual to take his
own life furnishes a rational motivation for suicide.31
Indeed, that may be correct. At the same time, the mere possibility that some level of
serious physical incapacity might, for some persons, under some circumstances, constitute
some part of the basis of a rational choice to commit suicide tells us rather little. Posner
elaborates on this argument by considering the plaintiffs in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, the trial court case that gave rise to Washington v. Glucksberg.32 There, as he
says, the court’s description of the plaintiffs—that is, those of the plaintiffs suffering from
terminal illness—is indeed “harrowing.”33 And perhaps Posner is right that “[i]t is easy to see
that an individual who is soon to die anyway may have a negative expected utility of
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See POSNER, supra note 10, at 238.
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521 U.S. 702 (1997). Glucksberg is, of course, the companion case to Vacco v. Quill. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
Glucksberg and Quill, famously, were decided unanimously by the Court on the same day in 1997. Together,
the cases firmly and unanimously reject a constitutional right to access to PAS. In Glucksberg, action
commenced when three, anonymous, terminal patients, five physicians, and the nonprofit organization
Compassion in Dying, brought suit challenging the Constitutional permissibility of a Washington state statute
banning PAS. We may, of course, acknowledge the plight of those anonymous patients without acceding to
their legal brief.
33

See POSNER, supra note 10, at 239.
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living.”34 But that such a negative assessment is possible does not make it—to any particular
degree—likely, much less necessary. And even in the face of a negative expected utility,
assessed in the face of extreme suffering, a patient might rationally prefer any number of
substitutes to PAS. For one thing, the patient might simply prefer adequate pain medication,
a generally feasible and entirely lawful alternative, which unfortunately many terminal
patients are denied.35
What then, is there, beyond the claim that it is not merely analytic that a request for
PAS is pathological? Regarding emotional and cognitive disorders among the terminal
elderly, Posner argues that:
Anyone who decides to kill himself must find his life depressing, and, with
“suicidal ideation” and the like used to diagnose depression, it is apparent that
one would have to assume that suicide is irrational in order to be justified in
declaring suicide irrational because the person who committed suicide was
depressed. The argument is circular.36
Indeed, that argument is circular. And that argument does exist in the literature, and
does reflect an ongoing tendency on the part of some mental health professionals to
34

See id. at 239. A recent interview with Judge Posner may be instructive here. Reflecting on his father’s last
years, Judge Posner is quoted as saying “[b]ecause my father was more or less compos mentis and wanted
treatment, you couldn’t deny it. . . . [T]he notion of giving up, not fighting to the end, was anathema to him. I
hope my generation can be a little more rational about this. I’d like to choose my own time of exit.” Larissa
MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001, at 78, 83.

35

See generally Council on Scientific Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Good Care of the Dying Patient, 275 JAMA
474, 475 (1996) (noting that in hospice care only two percent of dying patients suffer pain that is difficult for the
treatment team to manage); Robert McCann et al., Comfort Care for Terminally Ill Patients: The Appropriate
Use of Nutrition and Hydration, 272 JAMA 1263, 1263-65 (1994) (monitoring thirty-two consecutively
admitted, terminally ill patients in a comfort care setting, none of whom reported “much discomfort”; especially
striking indications of the potential of palliative care were that, of the patients reporting “some discomfort,” two
suffered from metastases of cancer to bone and liver, one was an eighty-three year-old woman with lung cancer
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and one began his stay with significant bony pain from multiple
myloma). Cf. Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and its Treatment in Outpatients with Metastatic Cancer, 300
NEW ENG. J. MED. 592 (1994) (reporting that forty-two percent of its sample of 597 cancer patients were not
given adequate analgesic therapy).
36

See POSNER, supra note 10, at 240.
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see the contemplation of suicide as itself psychological pathology.37 But if that
argument is something more than a straw horse, it is something rather less than the
typical concern about depression and volition. In brief, it does not reflect the
dominant contemporary view of depression and suicide and it is not the typical
argument.
It is generally true that “suicidal ideation” is used to diagnose depression. It is not
generally true that suicidal ideation is itself a mood disorder or that it is sufficient, as a
symptom, to justify diagnosis of a mood disorder.38 For example, the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) lists suicidal
ideation as but one of nine criteria for a Major Depressive Episode.39 And the DSM-IV
requires that five or more of the nine symptoms be present during a given two-week period
for a positive diagnosis.40
That is not to say that suicidal ideation is not legitimate grounds for therapeutic
concern. Of course it is. But the general psychiatric concern with suicidal patients is more
complex than is captured in Posner’s argument and does not logically preclude a rational
choice to seek PAS. Posner’s circle is not closed, much less vicious.
It is surprising that Posner’s treatment of emotional and cognitive disorders among
37

See, e.g., Linda Ganzini et al., Evaluation of Competence to Consent to Assisted Suicide: Views of Forensic
Psychiatrists, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 595, 595 (2000) (reporting the results of a survey of 456 board-certified
forensic psychiatrists). Posner cites Thomas J. Marzen, “Out, Out Brief Candle”: Constitutionally Prescribed
Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 24 J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 261, 274 (1991).
38

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 317444 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (reviewing various classes of mood disorders and anxiety disorders);
see also Ganzini, et al., supra note 37, at 595-96.
39

See DSM-IV, supra note 38, at 327.

40

See id.
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elderly terminal patients is so superficial. Much of Posner’s “theory” of old age can be read
as a morbid meditation on the worst forms of decline that old age may have to offer.41
Indeed, Posner himself recognizes—then glosses—the issue in his chapter on Euthanasia and
Geronticide.42 But despite his substantial preoccupation with the cognitive and emotional
impairment that aging may bring, Posner does not seem interested in the question whether
legalization of PAS will in fact offer a bona fide option for many patients who are not well
placed to engage in the ordinary life practice of choosing, much less that of choosing between
possible “arms length” transactions with doctors who are their caregivers and, not
incidentally, state-appointed gatekeepers to regulated narcotic painkillers.43
In fact, there is a complex relationship between pain, depression, and requests for
PAS. For example, it has been observed that under-medication of pain symptoms can
promote or aggravate depression in the terminal elderly, and can otherwise prompt requests
for PAS, requests that often disappear in the face of adequate pain medication.44 And several
authors have expressed special concern about the relationship between depression and PAS in
women patients.45 For example, Lynn Kohm and Britney Brigner have observed that women
are twice as likely as men to suffer from major depression, and that such depression, and its
41

“Aging is most usefully viewed as a process one element of which is an inexorable decline across a broad
range of bodily (including both physical and mental) capabilities: call this ‘bodily decline.’” See id. at 18.
42

See POSNER, supra note 10, at 236.
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And, at least in the case of Medicare patients, gatekeeper to hospice care, as coverage depends on the
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underlying causes, make women more likely both to request PAS and to acquiesce to external
pressures to seek PAS.46
Especially troubling is the observation that “[w]hile far fewer women than men kill
themselves, three times as many women as men try to kill themselves.”47 To the extent that
this disparity reflects a large number of women trying not to end their lives but to seek help,48
we ought to be concerned that legalized PAS might well lower an important threshold for
emotionally troubled women who are not beyond psychological assistance and whose lives
might otherwise be significantly extended in ways valuable to themselves and others. The
case for PAS as an alternative to irremediable suffering might appear compelling,49 but the
brief for PAS as a low-cost substitute for adequate psychiatric treatment does not.50
This is, of course, a telegraphic discussion of the thorny problems of depression
among the terminal patients Posner addresses. I am not arguing that such cases of depression
exhaust the domain. I am not arguing that all cases of depression or any other form of
suffering can be adequately treated, much less that they all necessarily obviate the possibility
of rational choice. I am not arguing that there are no rational exercises of genuine volition in
requesting PAS. I am suggesting: (1) that our ordinary assumptions about the stability of
46

See id. at 260-64.
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See id. at 266 (quoting Bard Lindeman, Deal with Suicide Realities, But Discard the Myths, RECORD
(Northern New Jersey), Apr. 11 1996, at H6).
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See id. at 241-42.
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See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
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Of course, that is not a logically impossible argument. Part of a cost-benefit analysis of PAS must be an
analysis of substitution effects that ought to attend various policy options. And things get thorny when one
contemplates these costs through the lens of Medicare and Medicaid subsidies. Where PAS comes cheap and
psychiatric treatment—at least for a certain class of patients—comes dear, PAS might look that much more
attractive as a substitute locus of public subsidy. But that is surely an unhappy argument. As far as I know, it
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preferences and the autonomy of choice are—as matters of empirical fact—complicated when
we consider depression among elderly medical patients suffering some terminal disease; (2)
that these complications raise serious concerns for any analysis of costs and benefits of the
legalization of PAS;51 and (3) that Posner’s argument about depression cannot possibly settle
the matter. In Section IV, below, I shall more thoroughly examine the problem of consent
with regard to cognitive—rather than affective—disorders among terminal, elderly medical
patients. That will serve both to push Posner’s analysis further into the red and to illustrate
just one of the kinds of independent empirical analyses that need to underlie this sort of
economic discussion.
Before turning to Posner’s model of legalization as a sort of technological innovation,
I should briefly consider Posner’s discussion of medical norms and his argument that
concerns about confounding the role of the physician via change in legal regime are
misplaced.52 Here, he makes a conceptual point and an empirical one. In the first case, he
argues that tolerating the spectacle of ghastly pain “can also create ambivalence about
healing.”53 Thus, presumably, PAS prohibitions may blur the mission, confound the
psychology, and create competing pressures on the reputational assets of physicians as easily
as would their repeal. Second, he suggests that the Dutch experience with euthanasia, from

51

For example, these complications about the sort of institutional arrangements that might mitigate fears of
involuntary—or at least nonvoluntary—euthanasia. One large scale survey revealed that most forensic
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at 595 (reporting that 51% were “not at all confident” they could make the diagnosis; 43% were only “somewhat
confident”; and only 6% were “very confident”).
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the 1970s through much of the 1990s, under conditions of relatively light legal prohibition
and weak enforcement, signals that more widespread practice of PAS in the United States
would not lead to any sort of general decline in respect for life, either within the medical
profession or without. To that end, Posner takes issue with one of the chief, then-current,
English-language sources alleging that PAS is not always performed with patient consent in
the Netherlands.54
A detailed sociological assessment of the Dutch experience with PAS will not be
found in Posner’s discussion and I do not mean to offer a substitute here; it is beyond both the
scope of this article and my own expertise. But because the specter of Dutch euthanasia
looms so large in the greater policy debate, I should raise a few points on the way to
bracketing this discussion. First, Posner’s critique of Carlos Gomez’s account of Euthanasia
in the Netherlands is at least contentious, and is based on no independent empirical ground.55
Second—more important and perhaps no surprise here—the character and effects of Dutch
practice of PAS remain a source of controversy, as have reports of numerous instances of
non-voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands;56 certainly, and at least, the intervening years
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See id. at 241. (critiquing CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS (1991)).
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See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1143-44 (2002) (reviewing PAUL
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See, e.g., Richard Fenigsen, The Report of the Dutch Governmental Committee on Euthanasia, 7 ISSUES L. &
MED.339 (1991); John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 261 (John Keown ed. 1995); Loes
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see Jocelyn Downie, The Contested Lessons of Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 8 HEALTH L.J. 119 (2000)
(arguing not that Dutch practice is unproblematic, but that many reports on Dutch PAS are significantly flawed).
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have not rendered the international medical community sanguine about PAS in the
Netherlands. Third, as others have observed, observations drawn from a small, ethnically
homogeneous nation—one with vastly different norms and market conditions surrounding
medical practice—may be of limited value in generating predictions about U.S. medical
practice.57 Fourth, the period of Dutch practice Posner considers does not quite mirror his
contemplated legal change in any case; the Netherlands has only very recently decriminalized
PAS (under certain conditions), so whatever we make of Posner’s quarrel with Gomez, et al.,
we might well reserve judgment on what legalization holds even within the Netherlands.
Observations from Oregon might further support Posner’s claim against a slippery
slope. Certainly wholesale adoption of PAS by the medical community has not obtained in
Oregon.58 Surveys of physician practice indicate that most patient requests for PAS are
rejected.59 Indeed, several large medical centers and about one-third of Oregon physicians
reject the practice of PAS outright, on religious, moral, or philosophical grounds.60
At least the most pessimistic predictions about PAS have not come to fruition. But we
do not yet know much about Oregon itself, after a few short years of legal sanction for one
form of PAS. Apart from the questions whether and to what extent Oregon may be a useful
model for those considering the rest of the United States, we might well wonder about the
57

See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Constitutionalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide: Will Lightening Strike Thrice?, 35
DUQ. L. REV. 159, 172-73 (1996) (discussing doctors’ and nurses’ tendencies to inaccurately asses the decision
making competence of the dying).
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See Ganzini et al., supra note 26, at 557 (reporting that physicians grant one in six requests for a prescription
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relevant time scale at which to evaluate Oregon practice. Given widespread entrenchment of
social norms generally, and physician norms in particular, a few years period of observation is
likely far too brief.61 Deeply entrenched mores do not tend to shift so quickly in the face of
policy innovations.62 What’s less clear is how long we have to wait for change to verify the
null hypothesis.
Again, we have an argument from Posner—this time quasi-empirical—that the
putative costs for PAS may not be so great as some contend. Again, we lack both a value and
a methodology for fixing that value for this component of our analysis. But perhaps we may
forgive an uncertain and contentious intuition about familiar elements of the PAS policy
debate, if Posner’s model of regime change, and the likely effects of change on consumption,
proves fruitful.

III. A Model of Consumption
The centerpiece of Posner’s PAS discussion is his formal model of PAS legalization
as a sort of information-bearing technology. Here, Posner leaves behind the complex,
perhaps fractional, policy debate for the question whether legalization would, in fact, prompt

that one Catholic health care organization operating three large hospitals in Portland prohibits doctors from
participating in PAS).
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See supra note 14 (regarding the Oregon statute). Although initially approved by citizens’ initiative in
November, 1994, implementation of the statute was delayed by injunction until 1997. See Lee v. Oregon, 107
F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacating the permanent injunction ordered by the lower court at 869 F. Supp.
1491 (D.Or. 1994)).
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more or fewer cases of suicide.63 That is, he describes the semantics for a formal inequality
that would model a decrease in the rational consumption of suicide under certain conditions.64
The gist of Posner’s argument is this: rational (utility maximizing) consumers of a good—
suicide—might decrease consumption of that good, in the face of lowered price, under certain
conditions; that is, briefly, where neither the demand for the good nor the cost of the good
remains constant.65
Posner sees the choice between his proposed legal regime and the status quo as,
essentially, the choice between static and dynamic decision procedures under conditions of
uncertainty. That is, under the present legal regime, one chooses between committing suicide
now or not at all, whereas under the contemplated legal regime one chooses between
committing suicide now, later, or not at all. Under the present regime, an individual will
commit suicide if:
pUd > (1 – p) Uh + c
where p is the relevant probability, c is the total cost (financial, pain, suffering, anxiety, etc.)
of committing suicide, Ud is the utility to be derived from living in the “doomed state,” and
Uh is the utility to be derived from living in the healthy state.66 That is just a way of saying
that one will commit suicide just in case the expected utility of present suicide (as potential
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pain or suffering avoided) exceeds the expected utility of continued life plus the costs entailed
by the act of suicide.67
Given a pessimistic prognosis, it is presumed that p is relatively small. To the extent
Ud and Uh have like values, the decision to commit suicide will hinge on c. Because c—seen
as a sort of transaction cost—is substantial under the present legal regime, many will avoid
suicide altogether precisely because of that transaction cost, not because of any great utility to
continued life (or delta in utilities between living and dying). Moreover, where a prognosis is
bleak, many will choose to commit suicide—despite some non-trivial degree of doubt
regarding the prognosis—because to delay the choice risks incapacity which, under the
present legal regime, will remove the choice.68
Remove the now-or-never dilemma by introducing a new information-bearing
technology—PAS—and that latter class of suicides disappears. That is, when, upon grim but
uncertain prognosis, the patient may easily postpone the decision whether to commit suicide
because suicide assistance may be obtained later, a rational choice to commit suicide will
obtain only when – Uh > c.69 But as it is supposed that both Uh and c are positive, this class
of preemptive suicides disappears; and the class disappears independent of the fact that we
have reduced the value of c (the cost). That is, to the extent that life in the present has some
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positive value, one could not rationally trade that value against a state of affairs that is
presumed to have no value, either positive or negative, in and of itself, but the achievement of
which entails some positive cost.
Think of Posner’s story this way: Under the first regime (a model of the general
prohibition), a terminally ill patient (or anyone else) must, at time T1, decide whether to
commit suicide. The price of the undertaking is held to be relatively high, partly because the
patient lacks expertise (and—presumably—experience) in the successful commission of
suicide, partly because there is some cost to violating the law, and partly because committing
suicide at time T1 involves a substantial opportunity cost in the face of incomplete medical
information and positively valued life foregone.70 If one’s health is seriously declining at T1,
waiting until a subsequent time T2—for better information, closer proximity to the threshold
between positive and negative utility for existence, etc.—promises benefits, but benefits
bought at the following price: by the time things are truly awful, and more certainly bleak, the
would-be suicide may no longer be capable of ending her own life. Absent the availability of
lawful PAS, the price of suicide skyrockets simultaneously with the patient’s incapacity.
Committing suicide at time T1 is a sort of hedge against both that skyrocketing cost and
anticipated horror. In the limit, the possibility of obtaining such a hedge may be seen as a
now-or-never dilemma.
Under Posner’s alternative regime—legal PAS—the patient at time T1 will very likely
wait until some subsequent time T2 for at least two reasons: first, because there is, at least
initially, supposed to be a positive value to continued life (and because costs remain high at
T1 under both regimes), there is some impetus to wait; second, because it is anticipated that
70

See id.
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the price of suicide will drop—not rise—sharply with the advent of the patient’s incapacity,
as PAS under the contemplated regime is only permitted for those who cannot help
themselves.
Several things differentiate T2, under the competing models. First, because PAS is
lawfully available the technical impediments to suicide (the risk of pain, the risk of horrible,
but not fatal, self-injury) drop even as information about the patient—and likely futures—
becomes more readily available. Thus, costs drop. Second, because information becomes
cheaper, doubts about the patient and her condition are, at the margin, likely reduced. And
thus, the initial class of potential consumers is partitioned into several. Most crudely: for
some demand increases, for some it remains constant, and for some it decreases. If demand
drops enough—either because things are not as bad as originally feared or because one dies of
natural causes (or medical error) in the meantime—one will not consume PAS despite the
lower price.
This is a somewhat expanded consideration of Posner’s basic intuition; namely, that
where the price of present, unassisted suicide is greater than the utility of “the dying state,”
suicide consumption will be suppressed, and that the utility of the dying state might actually
be increased via the law’s permission of PAS.71 Of course, Posner is aware that a drop in
consumption is not logically inevitable with a shift from the first regime (no legal PAS) to the
second (legal PAS).72 But Posner suggests that the model has general plausibility and that
there are reasons for optimism:
.
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The general point—that the availability of a service can reduce rather than, as
one might expect, increase the utilization of a service—is neither inconsistent
with assuming rational behavior by persons facing horrific choices nor limited
to suicide. Suppose that you get a sharp pain in your abdomen on Friday
afternoon. If your physician’s office is closed on weekends, you may rush to
the office on Friday, lest your condition worsen during the weekend. But if the
office is open on weekends you may decide to wait and see whether the pain
gets better or worse. In most cases it will get better, so there will be fewer
total visits, in the class of cases represented by the example, if the physician is
more available.73
Indeed one may do just that. But there are many yarns we can spin, and not all are
consistent with the claim that increased office hours results in decreased visits to the office, a
claim that—taken most generally—is paradoxical on its face. Here is a tale that bears the
distinction of being true, however it might, as a model, prove or fail at universality. That is,
I’ve heard this tale as an historical report rather than imagined it as a counterfactual. While
serving as a physician on a reservation, under the aegis of the United States Public Health
Service, my acquaintance “Dr. J” saw patients without charge at all hours of the day and
night. Readers may be somewhat (or not at all) surprised to learn that patients consulted Dr. J
on all manner of affliction—including boredom, loneliness, minor gastro-intestinal irritation,
headache, nausea, and intoxication—at all hours. They did not necessarily wait until
Monday—or even Saturday morning—just because they knew they could be seen over the
weekend or after. This is not to cast aspersions on the residents of any particular unnamed
reservation. Faced with an available (read: less expensive) good—free weekend visits, day or
night—persons consumed more than they would otherwise have done. That is normal market
behavior, ceteris paribus. Indeed, such behavior is “normal” in the deepest sense of the word:
it is not merely typical but paradigmatic—even nomological—market behavior.
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Greater convenience appeared to raise consumption. Feel a sharp pain on Friday and
you may or may not wait to see a doctor. Feel a sharp pain on Saturday and you may fail to
wait until Monday, if the doctor will see you Saturday or Sunday. That is true even if your
condition is one that would, known or unbeknownst to you, resolve itself by Monday. And
that is true despite the fact that present—rather than postponed—medical intervention carries
its own risks.
Here’s the rub: Posner supposes that demand will generally decrease because, just as
with tummy aches, “[i]n most cases it will get better.”74 But that’s not necessarily so, even
for ailments that typically get better. Moreover, although it is true that doctors make
mistakes—in diagnoses and otherwise—it is not obvious that patients diagnosed with
terminal, debilitating disease typically “get better.” And the difference between the two legal
regimes is not just that “the availability of physician-assisted suicide increases the option
value of continued living.”75 For under the second regime (Posner’s version of permissible
PAS), the price of the good decreases substantially at T2—relative to T1 under the second
regime and relative to any time under the first regime. Trivially, lowering the price of a good
may increase consumption even if demand remains constant; depending on what drops at
what rate, it may increase consumption even if demand decreases.
Posner is right when he argues that lowering the price of a substitute for a good will
tend to reduce the demand for that good. And he’s technically right that, “nothing in
economics teaches that this reduction must be fully offset by the increased demand for the
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…[substitute] good.”76 Very generally, we do not suppose that the simplest snapshot
characterization of the relationship between price and demand must hold across markets and
time. Still, I believe that Posner is wrong to suggest that there is no tension between his
projection and the law of demand; roughly, the utility of the snapshot model exceeds its
boundary conditions, strictly conceived. That is a good thing generally. And in this
particular case, I suspect that the fact of reduced cost is not likely to be swamped by other
changes in the relevant market.77 To make the case otherwise, at the very least, Posner ought
to have done more work to close the problem space, and to show why alternative models are
not likely applicable to this good, for these consumers, under these conditions. Rules that
hold ceteris paribus may not hold where all is not equal. But assuming that they function in
inverse cannot be as trivial as Posner appears to suppose.
In fairness, we may note again that Posner does not take it to be certain that legalized
PAS will suppress suicide consumption. Rather, he argues at length that legalization of PAS
“might … reduce the number of suicides and postpone the suicides that occur.”78 Bracketing
the qualification, we note that there is a sort of double gap in the analysis here. Posner rightly
spends a great portion of his chapter trying to tease out the implications of legalization on
demand for and consumption of PAS. Surely we cannot begin to tally costs and benefits
76
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attending some change in the law before we have at least a general sense of the consequences
of that change.
Critically, we need to know more systematically—ideally with some precision—
which and how many persons will bear the first-party costs and enjoy (although “enjoy” is
surely the wrong word) the first-party benefits of legalized PAS, if we are to begin to develop
some sense of the utility of the proposed policy change. To that end, being unclear about both
the ordinal and the magnitude of change in consumption attending legalization cannot be
regarded as a minor imprecision of argument.
Before moving on to the question of third-party costs, I think it important to consider
another aspect of Posner’s model; that is, the fundamental question of uncertainty as regards
decision making under either extant or contemplated legal regimes. To that end, I want to
consider both the empirical question of the extent to which such decision making is likely to
be impaired and the conceptual question how to conceive of possible errors in decision
making.

IV. Cognitive Impairment In Hospitalized Elderly Patients
Robert A. Burt has suggested that communication problems may arise due to various
“confusional states” that may be prevalent in the elderly.79 And this is a point well worth
examination. For Burt’s brief discussion raises a concern that, if borne out, does more than
cast the terminal elderly as a vulnerable population; it casts in doubt the promise of PAS for
the largest, and socially the broadest, population of possible candidates. Communication
problems raise questions of information costs and, possibly, information asymmetries for
79
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those who would participate in a PAS transaction. Perhaps more difficult, they raise
questions about our ordinary assumptions about consent and contractual competence,
assumptions that may not be tenable—at least as default assumptions—in this odd and
particular case.
The term “confusional states” has fallen into disuse. It was widely considered
ambiguous and does not describe a category of mental impairment in the DSM-IV.80
Nonetheless, Burt’s point remains important, for the pieces of research he discussed offered
systematic accounts of bona fide cognitive impairments in the elderly; this is a case of revised
taxonomy, not null reference. Recast, the general observations remain: (1) cognitive
impairments are common among the elderly, terminal patients that constitute the largest body
of candidates for PAS;81 (2) such impairments are often difficult to detect and in many cases
are not detected by the physicians and nurses caring for impaired patients;82 and (3) because
of such impairments, “obtaining a truly informed consent is problematic.”83
Here, we are chiefly concerned with certain cognitive—as opposed to affective—
disorders, with impairments to reasoning and memory classified as delirium, dementia, and

80
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amnestic and other cognitive disorders.84 This is in contrast with the mood disorders and
anxiety disorders that were Kohm and Brigner’s focus, though in many cases such conditions
may similarly confound the problem of bona fide volitional choice, may well appear as
comorbid, and indeed may interact with cognitive impairments.85
In brief, “[a] delirium is characterized by a disturbance of consciousness and a change
in cognition that develop over a short period of time,”86 not typically longer than one month.87
“A dementia is characterized by multiple cognitive deficits that include impairment in
memory.”88 Dementia may, like delirium, be remitting, or it may have a static or progressive
course, often being associated with other diseases and fatality.89 Amnestic disorders are
“characterized by memory impairment in the absence of other significant cognitive
impairments.”90 Like dementia, amnestic disorders present a highly variable course,
depending on the underlying etiology of the impairment.91 Finally, “confusional states” may
fit the catch-all category of “cognitive disorder not otherwise specified.”92 Note that any of
these impairments has the potential to disturb effective decision making on the part of the
patient, as they may impair (1) gathering information, in dialogue with a physician or
84
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otherwise; (2) retaining information critical to decision making; (3) having all the relevant
information “present” (cognitively accessible) during decision making; (4) formulating a
sound decision based on the limited information at hand; (5) formulating a decision that is
stable rather than transitory; and (6) communicating a stable decision to caregivers.
Again, Burt’s observation that cognitive deficits—“confusional states”—are common
among the dying is borne out by diverse research. Indeed, his cited figure seems low.93 This
is likely due, in part, to the difficulty of detecting various deficits and, in part, to the higher
incidence of delirium among the elderly.94 “[B]etween one-third and one-half of the
hospitalized elderly are likely to be delirious at some point.”95 And this does not nearly
exhaust the range of relevant cognitive and affective deficits. The observation that cognitive
impairment is often—in fact, typically—undetected likewise enjoys diverse support.96 Here
we are concerned not just with inadequacies in the process of obtaining informed consent, but
with impairments to competence itself, one of the fundamental prerequisites to informed
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consent. All of this may obtain in patients well able to read and sign a consent form.97 More
generally, we are concerned with whether our default assumptions about contractual
competence in the most general sense can be maintained in a particular medical setting.
Clinical difficulties in identifying cognitive impairment are likely to be to some
degree intransigent. For example, they are not eliminated in palliative care settings, where
“doctors and nurses spend more time talking to patients than the average physician and
nurse.”98 And such clinical failures can arise under standards of practice that are unlikely to
appear defective in standard quality-of-care metrics.99 This is the biomedical foundation or
baseline from which we might begin to ask whether effective consent procedures might
plausibly be constructed. And it is atop this foundation that we might consider further
confounding factors such as susceptibility to coercion and the general tendency towards some
degree of failure in the implementation of facially plausible legal safeguards.100
That is not to say that problems of competence and consent need be fundamentally
intractable. But it is to raise a very serious question about our standard assumptions
concerning the utility of additional “choices.” Absent such assumptions, we face a difficult
task in specifying the sort of institutional structures that might set the cost-benefit balancing
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right again. Posner suggests that fears of involuntary euthanasia “can be minimized by
relatively simple regulations, such as a requirement that the patient’s consent …be witnessed
or in writing, that the physician report … to a hospital committee, and that … he consult with
a duly certified specialist in the ethics of dealing with dying patients.”101 This suggestion
appears optimistic, to say the least.
Questions about what sort of certification is due are almost beside the point. Posner’s
institutional suggestion cannot be adequate to the task. It might or might not be costly to
implement—reflect on the burdens already faced by Institutional Review Boards for human
subjects research—but it is unlikely to identify most of the problem cases whatever its cost.102
Again, those professionals best equipped to do the screening doubt their own ability to
perform reliably in a single exam and there is no obvious form of outside consultation or
documentation adequate to cure this fundamental defect.103
One might, of course, design better institutional filters for problematic requests than
those suggested by Posner’s “relatively simple regulations.” But the obvious questions
remain: What would a reliable screening procedure entail? What would it cost? What sort of
error rate would a “reliable” screen tolerate?104 And what is the cost of a mistake? In
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We might note that, better procedures or no, there exist no candidate screening procedures that can plausibly
be advanced as either effective or semi-effective decision procedures for genuine consent. That is, at the very
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addition, we might well wonder whether implementation of a more rigorous screening
procedure would shrink the market (and possible summed benefits) for PAS even as it
implicated substantial process costs; to the extent that a screen entails additional testing,
expert third-party evaluations, and delays (both for testing generally and to test the diachronic
stability of expressed preferences in particular), the screen itself might well impugn the
promise of PAS to allow terminal patients to choose the timing and manner of their deaths.105

V. Tallying Death: The Interpersonal Value of Dying vs. the Interpersonal Cost
of Killing.
V(a). Cost-benefit Analysis and the Interpersonal Valuation of Lives.
I suggested early on that Posner seemed to have in mind the most general sort of
balancing of costs and benefits for the PAS debate; that is, that his argument is not wedded to
any particular technical scheme of the sorts implemented in cost-benefit analysis in the
agencies.106 To some extent, that is to Posner’s advantage. For while the techniques of costbenefit analysis become increasingly well entrenched, they are hardly uncontroversial in

fundamentally to state-sanctioned or state-sponsored suicide, even without adopting a more general objection to
the act of suicide itself. Moreover, one might plausibly gauge the costs of implementing the sort of change in
legal regime required for lawful PAS to be so great, even on behalf of ideal cases that, a very small number of
inevitable errors would inevitably sink social welfare arguments on behalf of such a change. See, for example,
the Court’s opinions in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997), for a partial catalogue of relevant costs. See also, e.g., Brief for the American Medical Association, et
al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
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either their particulars or their most general methodological commitments.107 At the same
time, Posner’s informal approach may be seen as a limitation. Absent a problematic method
for comparing our present legal state of affairs with the scheme he contemplates, Posner may
be left with no systematic method at all. Pace Posner’s very strong view of the information
benefits implicit in PAS, common law and economics techniques, such as focusing on a
salient, dominant, and univocal economic effect of some considered policy or other, simply
do not appear to be available in this case.108 I have already suggested that it is conspicuous
that Posner’s calculation is seriously incomplete. What is more, he has skirted entirely a raft
of technical difficulties posed by questions he himself has recognized. What would a more
complete analysis look like, supposing that such a thing is at all tractable?
The PAS question is in many ways the sort of question to which cost-benefit analysis
is often applied.109 Contemplating the costs and benefits of legalized PAS entails considering
numerous non-market and quasi-market phenomena. This is true both within the health care
arena and without. It also entails contemplating a policy change that is liable to be enmeshed
in a significant regulatory environment itself. Moreover, one of the most striking issues in the
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PAS debate is the question of how we attach value—either positive or negative—to certain
sorts of lives. That is a question at the heart of much methodological debate about costbenefit analysis more generally.110 For there we find ample disagreement about both the
propriety and the particulars of fixing, as a policy matter, an interpersonal monetary value for
human lives. I want to suggest that these issues should be especially salient in the present
debate in at least two ways. First, standard valuations of statistical lives—especially
monotonic valuations abstracted from age and health—appear to present an exceedingly poor
fit for concerns about loss of life in end-of-life decision making generally. Second, as I have
argued, any policy proposal for the legalization of PAS must, as a practical matter,
contemplate a non-trivial error rate, delivering a “service” for which nobody properly
contracts.111 If that is right, then the cost of such errors themselves calls for valuation.
The literature on monetary valuations of human lives of the sorts contemplated by
cost-benefit analysis is substantial. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a thorough
review of that literature, much less to settle the myriad issues raised there. Still, I think that
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See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992), and
W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843 (2000) (discussing both the general notion of equalizing
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The 6.1 Million Question, Global Development and Environment Institute, G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-06
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the problem of PAS is relevant to this area of the cost-benefit literature for several reasons.112
Most generally, the details of the PAS debate make especially salient a significant problem
with the interpersonal valuation of lives lost or saved for policy purposes: That is, (a) the
entire debate over PAS would never get off the ground were it not for the fact that many
people care very deeply about how they die and not just when they die; and (b) the variation
in preferences and magnitudes of preference appears great, and appears to cross-cut familiar
and accessible differences in income, wealth, and education.113 Consideration of PAS may
then provide a useful domain in which to consider certain risk management questions in the
alternative to the well-developed cases from the world of environmental regulation.
Moreover, to the extent that problems from the risk management literature are problems in
assessing the costs of an intractable and non-trivial rate of error under any PAS scheme too,
then we have a further hurdle for Posner’s analysis and policy recommendation.
Cost-benefit analysis is often concerned to balance the policy costs and benefits
attending some means of risk reduction.114 Commonly, the point of the risk reduction—say,
through environmental regulation regarding a superfund site cleanup—is a statistical
prediction of reduced deaths, according to some likelihood and degree of confidence.115
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Note that much of that literature concerns valuations of life from the particular perspective of environmental
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Because the assessment is fundamentally stochastsic and predictive, we may know with
greater or lesser precision the population from which the putative n lives are saved, but not
the particular individuals who are actually to live or die under the policy initiative. Thus, we
need an interpersonal value for each life (supposedly) saved if we are to balance benefits
against costs.116
Perhaps the most commonly used method for fixing a value in the agencies is W. Kip
Viscusi’s “value-of-life” methodology, a valuation technique that derives its estimates from
labor market data said to reflect willingness to pay to avoid risks.117 Based on his
methodology, Viscusi has estimated the value of life at roughly $ 5 million, in 1990 dollars.118
The motivation for a homogenous valuation ought to be conspicuous, especially from
a policy perspective. As Viscusi puts it,
[o]ne quite reasonable notion of risk equity is that if society is homogenous in
its attitudes towards risk, then agencies should equalize the marginal cost per
life saved across regulatory programs. Doing so will maximize the number of
lives saved for any given cost amount.119
This may serve not merely to maximize policy returns (and, not incidentally, to avoid
some of the spectacular imbalances we have seen in public risk management
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efforts).120 It may, as well, impose a certain version of equity on public policy
regarding risk management.121
Nonetheless, there are good grounds to look for heterogeneity. The main approaches
from cost-benefit analysis are either income (or wealth) invariant—fixing a unitary value for
the society as a whole—or not.122 But in no case do we find a metric that even begins to
grapple with the sorts of variation we see in common preferences regarding medical decisions
at the end of life.123 In that regard, we should consider that at least several authors have
questioned whether risk valuations need to account for variations in types of deaths as
opposed to deaths simpliciter. For example, instantaneous deaths may be valued differently
from those that are prolonged,124 deaths by voluntarily assumed risks may be valued
differently from those by involuntary risks,125 and, certainly, deaths that are qualitatively
awful may be especially dreaded.126 Cancer deaths, for example, may generally be considered
120
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worse than others, and some work has been done on risk premiums paid regarding cancer
risks in particular.127
If we return to the illustration of the patient plaintiffs in Glucksberg, Quill, and, for
that matter, Cruzan, it takes little imagination to fix the variation in utility across something
like means-of-dying as, first, spectacular and, second, exceeding the bounds of the normal
distribution of revealed preferences in more typical markets.128 For example, the
pseudonymous plaintiff class in Glucksberg included (1) a sixty-nine-year-old retired
pediatrician who suffered from cancer, which, by 1994, had metastasized. She was bedridden
for more than a year before her case reached trial, and was constantly in pain during that time.
In addition, she suffered from swollen legs, bed sores, poor appetite, nausea and vomiting,
impaired vision, incontinence of bowel, and general weakness; (2) a forty-four-year-old artist
dying of AIDS who had experienced bouts of pneumonia; chronic, severe skin and sinus
infections; grand mal seizures; extreme fatigue; and suffered from cytomegalovirus retinitis, a
degenerative disease, which robbed him of most of his sight; and (3) a sixty-nine-year-old
retired sales representative who suffered from emphysema, which caused him a constant
sensation of suffocating, and which required constant connection to oxygen, and who also
suffered from heart failure.129 Nancy Cruzan, by contrast, was, following an automobile
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accident, confined to a Missouri state hospital in a persistent vegetative state when the Court
heard her (guardians’) appeal.130 These cases are all pitiable. They are not, however,
homogeneous.131 Neither are they typical.132 Contrast such cases—where either the patient
or some putative advocate therefore has attached some negative value to continued life—with
the myriad everyday cases in which patients seek some means to extend life (or, for example,
in hospice cases, where they seek at least to live their remaining days under certain
conditions). Together, such cases call into question whether any particular value might
reasonably be applied here—across cases, patients, time, etc.—and, so, whether there is any
particular “good” to be so valued.
Of course, any policy initiative can serve to impose a fixed valuation—whether
market-based or not—on the unwilling. To that extent, there is nothing special about the
problem of policy valuations of human lives or means to death and conditions of dying. What
is more plausibly special is the degree to which preferences vary and, at least for many
persons, the degree to which that variation involves or constitutes something deeply personal
and crucially important.133 There are two basic questions here, and the second may be
regarded as a special case of the first. The first has to do with what sort of imagined end-of130
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life market the usual value-of-life proxies are to substitute for: given the diversity of contexts
in which end-of-life decisions are faced—and the diversity and instability of reported
preferences across those contexts—is there some particular demand here to be charted? The
second has to do with whether we conceive differently of state-sanctioned deaths according to
whether they are accidental or not: how clear do we have to be on the “S” in PAS and how do
we calculate the social cost when the attribution of consent is in error?
With regard to the first question, I want to suggest that the debate over PAS provides
ample ground for the following conjecture: (1) any attempt to construct a monotonic
interpersonal valuation for human life, ranging across the contexts seen in end-of-life decision
making, is liable to be intractable; and (2) any attempt to construct a proxy market for the
risks posed by end-of-life decision making under a PAS regime is liable to be equally
intractable—the supposed relationship between the proxy and ideal markets being fatally
instable, if not simply question-begging. I would suggest, further, that the confounding
factors in such a constructive project are liable to cross-cut the usual filters involved in multivalued valuations of human life (income, wealth, education, etc.) and are liable to arise from
factors central to the individual preference functions that an interpersonal valuation is
supposed—somehow—to aggregate.
To put it another way, fixing an interpersonal valuation of life for regulatory purposes
typically supposes that there is an adequate proxy market—say in certain aspects of the labor
market—to stand for imagined, but nonexistent, markets in degrees of safety-by-regulation.
If the proxy is to function as an analogue, or contingent valuation, for the salient but
hypothetical market at issue, the proxy market must function as an adequate model of the
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hypothetical market; if not, the proxy is only a proxy by fiat.134 Thus, an adequate proxy
market supposes that both the proxy and that for which the proxy plays stand-in have—or
would have if realized—certain features in common.135 At least with regard to basic market
features, the two should be, in the ideal case, isomorphic. Some of these features may be
thought of as substantive—for example, that the real and imagined markets appear to be
driven by the same underlying preferences. Some of these features may be thought of as
structural— for example, that real and imagined demand should have the same degree of
diachronic stability or volatility and that, generally, the real and imagined demand should be
formally similar—the demand curves should have the same form and similar variance, and
that demand should partition the population (market) in the same way, etc. I believe that both
the substantive and structural assumptions are dubious in this case.
Of course, significant interpersonal variation, on its own, might cut either way in the
PAS debate; hence the very divergent majority opinions in Cruzan, on the one hand, and
Glucksberg, on the other. Indeed, the argument of the plaintiffs in Glucksberg was precisely
that the fundamental interests protected by the Court in Cruzan ought to be extended to those
seeking legally sanctioned PAS precisely because of the intensely personal and highly varied
preferences at stake.136 If the Court was unanimous in rejecting that proposed extension, it
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was nonetheless sensitive to the problems motivating the complaint.137
The complexity of medical decisions at the end of life may highlight a methodological
problem for cost-benefit analyses of a certain sort, but the complexity may speak in favor of
protecting individual autonomy, rather than restricting it. And that would appear to favor
Judge Posner’s overall policy recommendation, if not a particular means of justification for it.
That Posner took such pains to show that PAS could effectively reduce the incidence of
suicide overall and focus remaining suicides on information-rich patients, makes even more
sense if it supposes, rather than ignores, problems in valuing lives.
There is, however, another problem. Recall Section IV’s discussion of cognitive
impairments among the elderly and the attendant concern about diagnostic error. If those
concerns are well founded, then any legalized form of PAS—and certainly the one
contemplated by Posner—will do at least two things: (1) it will permit well-informed, freely
choosing, terminal patients to elect physician assistance in hastening death; and (2) it will
cause certain patients to be killed without those patients’ having made such a choice. The
question is not just one of how we value various sorts of lives, whether individual-byindividual or group-by-group. That question is difficult on its own, but it is not the whole of
it. The question is rather how we begin to value the practice of a certain sort of killing. I
suggest that that question involves difficult, if not intractable, issues of both first-person and
third-person valuations of the costs of violating or suspending some of our most deeply
entrenched moral norms.
It might, of course, be argued that we ought simply to look at wrongful death
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settlements to fix a value for PAS errors (intentional killings under what would be legally
sanctioned circumstances, but for the absence of the requisite proper consent). But that is
variously unsatisfactory. For one thing, the cases are difficult to compare where the
contemplated wrongful deaths may be exceedingly difficult to identify post hoc. For another,
to look at wrongful death settlements (and verdicts) is to wander from the policy goal of a
simple and consistent valuation across income, wealth, age, etc. Moreover—and critical
here—is that a wrongful death proxy would not contemplate the social cost of policies that
sanction wrongful and intentional killings above and beyond the costs to the particular
victims killed.
I simply do not know how to complete the policy analysis Posner contemplates.
Before closing, I do, however, want to do two things. First, I want to address the question I
have raised regarding the costs of killing versus the costs of allowing to die. This is, of
course, a disputed distinction in the PAS literature.138 Still, I think it useful to trace at least
some of the potential costs Posner has ignored and to further develop this category of costs.
The conclusion of that discussion will not be a completed cost-benefit analysis for PAS,
although it will imply that Posner omitted very substantial costs in his social welfare calculus
for PAS. Second, I want to suggest, briefly, how one might proceed if the project of costbenefit analysis proves intractable.
V(b). The Cost of Killing and a Third-party Cascade.
Earlier, I discussed Posner’s claim that legalization of PAS would not likely serve to
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diminish the entrenchment or appearance of norms of medical practice.139 His argument
turned, in part, on a contentious claim that such problems have not arisen in Dutch practice
since the decriminalization in the Netherlands of what we would consider PAS.140 I
mentioned, among other problems, the familiar one regarding social differences between the
Netherlands and the United States.141 Following that observation, I think it worthwhile to
consider some of the potential first-party and third-party costs that might follow legalization,
especially as they relate to medical care and the African-American population.
A great deal of ink has been spilled over the complicated and sometimes tragic history
of the medical profession’s treatment of various vulnerable populations.142 That history
includes, among other things, such diverse problems as forced surgical experimentation on
slaves,143 variable diagnosis and treatment—despite consistent disease states—according to
race and gender,144 and communication gaps between medical professionals and various
minority populations.145 Even a cursory recapitulation of that history is well beyond the
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scope of this paper.146 But one general moral to be drawn from that history is that even
seemingly minor issues can have very serious medical import. For example,
miscommunication between American physicians and Asian immigrants has—although not
necessarily borne of anything like the virulent, institutionalized racism that led to the abuse of
slaves—nonetheless led to serious and sometimes fatal misdiagnoses and mistreatment.147
And that—suboptimal communication with catastrophic consequences—may be a species of
problem with special import for PAS.
Proponents of PAS typically frame their arguments in terms of patient autonomy.148
In doing so, Posner is hardly unique. Legalized PAS is said to enhance or promote patient
autonomy by providing suffering terminal patients with a means, first, to exert some control
over the timing and manner of their deaths and, second, to end the suffering itself.149 The
argument from autonomy may—but need not—gloss the strong social and economic
constraints on end-of-life decision making. In its most basic form, the argument is simply
that legalization of PAS would provide, for some, a very welcome alternative in an array of
already limited choices. Indeed, even the best placed of those terminal patients for whom
PAS is an issue may face a very limited range of likely unhappy options in any case;
discussions of a “good death” cannot obscure the fact that for many, any end-of-life medical
decisions are decisions between very limited alternatives, under conditions of, in effect,
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extreme scarcity.

For some, the option to curtail the duration of a dying process that is

fraught with suffering may be extremely valuable. For others, the choice may be more
difficult. But ceteris paribus, an additional choice cannot have a value less than zero.
However, all things are not liable to be equal. I have already argued that concerns
about the autonomy argument need not be driven by paternalism, benign or otherwise. That
is, the problem is not that poor people, the elderly, or African-Americans, when faced with an
additional unfortunate opportunity, will tend to choose the “wrong” option. Rather, it is that
the notion of choice is especially complicated in the area of PAS, acutely so for a non-trivial
segment of the elderly, terminal population. And the issue becomes further complicated when
we consider the problem of special populations, a problem wholly ignored by Posner.
First, there is a serious question whether legalization of PAS would tend to diminish,
rather than enhance, the likelihood of informed choice in an already compromised
doctor/patient relationship. Extant biases in the delivery of medical care to vulnerable
populations might further skew information costs for persons already ill placed to acquire
reliable information about their conditions and care. Also, there is concern that legalization
would tend to skew the cost of substitutes for PAS—for example, that of adequate palliative
care—for persons already ill placed to pursue them. Finally, there are serious worries about
coercion under a regime allowing for institutionalized PAS.150
There is also concern that legalization would irremediably breach various elements of
physician responsibility and the presumption of trust in the doctor/patient relationship.151 In
social situations where that relationship is already significantly compromised, this could lead
150

See Vacco v. Quill, supra note 100, at 795.
See, e.g., Brief for the American Medical Association, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110).
151

49

to an extremely pernicious downward spiral, further compromising not just the ability of
terminal patients to make informed, autonomous choices, but also the ability of the medical
profession to deliver effective care to broader segments of vulnerable populations in diverse
circumstances.152 This entails, at least, a significant spillover cost that needs to be addressed
in this debate.
Concern for the import of PAS for variously vulnerable persons has been often
mentioned,153 but there has nonetheless been a dearth of in-depth analysis of this issue.
Several exceptions are noteworthy, but I will focus on just one. Specifically, I’ll look to
several issues raised by Patricia King and Leslie Wolf concerning African-American patients
and PAS.154 Most generally, Professors King and Wolf express well founded concerns that
legalization of PAS—typically advocated as critically enhancing patient autonomy—may
actually serve as a new locus of coercion and social pressure for already vulnerable
populations.
At the outset, we might do well to note a preliminary observation made by King and
Wolf, applying in this context a point often made much more broadly in bioethics; that is, that
attention to common (in statistical terms) characteristics of some minority group ought not to
obscure the very real, and significant, heterogeneity within that group, and that useful

152

A similar point has already been made with respect to the diagnosis and treatment of HIV in the AfricanAmerican community; that is, that public health efforts in the African-American community have been
hampered by, e.g., the legacy of Tuskegee and that this compromised care has had spillover effects for the
broader society in turn. See, e.g., James H. Jones, The Tuskegee Legacy: AIDS and the Black Community,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov./Dec. 1992, at 38.
153

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703, 704, and 730 (1997) (where the Court expresses concern
about vulnerable groups in general) and at 785 (where the Court expresses concern for not-fully-competent
patients, raising special concern about managed care); Burt, supra note 57.
154

See King & Wolf, supra note 146.

50

generalities ought not to be reified into over rigid stereotypes.155 The implication noted by
the authors is that we need to develop “thick descriptions”—detailed, complex, individual
descriptions—of patients to understand whether or to what extent they are vulnerable.156
Failure to develop such descriptions can have disastrous consequences in the delivery of care
to individual patients. And that is doubly problematic, given the general worries we have
raised regarding difficult-to-detect, and difficult-to-assess, cognitive impairment among the
more general population of elderly, terminal patients.157
Bracketing the importance of individual assessment, there are several general
observations of note. First, African-American patients are more likely than whites to express
distrust of the medical establishment generally, and are, in particular, less likely than whites
to support the legalization of PAS.158 Second, African-American distrust of the medical
establishment may be well founded, as it rests on a long history of mistreatment, which has
run the gamut, from benign neglect to exploitation and outright abuse.159 Indeed, abusive
treatment includes not just the aforementioned nineteenth century victimization of slaves, but
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recent and well-publicized activities. Probably most famous of these is the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study, which the Public Health Service extended into the 1970s (and might well have
extended rather longer if not for considerable external pressure to abandon it); that is, long
past the Nazi War Crimes Trials and the adoption of the Nuremberg Code, long past the
Declaration of Helsinki, and indeed some years past the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.160 And the Tuskegee Study was not the final scandal in that ongoing history.161
Leaving aside such stark cases of abuse, we note that the African-American community
continues to suffer disparate—and disadvantaged—access to health care in several significant
areas.162 For example, African-Americans are less likely than white Americans to receive
pharmacological therapy, diagnostic angiography and catheterization, and invasive surgical
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treatment for heart disease and stroke;163 and African-Americans suffer disparate health
outcomes, having higher death rates from coronary disease, breast cancer, colon cancer,
diabetes, and infant mortality.164 Third, in part because of this history, in part because of
frequent social and economic differences between medical professionals and AfricanAmerican patients, and in part because of the various gradations of racism—from the subtle
and unintentional to the overt—to which African-American patients may be subjected,
communication problems between medical professionals and their African-American patients
are common and can be quite serious.165
The communication problem is of special significance for our discussion, as it bears
both on the particular concerns of African-Americans and on some of our most general
concerns about PAS. Consider a cascade that miscommunication and mistrust might
engender. African-American patients—as a group—may tend to downplay or fail to discuss
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their pain symptoms with physicians.166 When they do discuss these symptoms, they may
have their subjective reports of pain significantly downgraded by their caregivers.167 Thus,
reports of pain symptoms by African-American patients may be biased at both ends of the
clinical encounter: Patients themselves may artificially depress both the frequency and
urgency of their reporting while physicians—typically unconsciously—downgrade those
reports further, reducing the magnitude of pain reports more than race-neutral error rates
would suggest.168 Moreover, such biases with respect to pain symptoms need to be
considered against the backdrop of a general medical tendency to under-treat pain symptoms
in terminal patients.169 Straightforwardly, under-representation of pain symptoms can lead to
under-medication of pain symptoms. And under-medication of pain symptoms can promote
or aggravate depression in the terminal elderly, and can otherwise prompt requests for PAS,
requests that often disappear in the face of adequate pain medication.170
Such miscommunication and mistrust might prompt clinical errors in a variety of
settings. But they may cause special—and especially hard to detect and document—problems
in end-of-life care. Medical decisions at the end of life are, typically, acute versions of
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complex decision making under uncertainty. These are frequently decisions that depend on
hard-to-manage information about myriad technical and biomedical phenomena. Moreover,
to the extent that relevant information is specialized to a given patient’s complex disease state
(and health history), sources of information independent from a given context of care may be
either nonexistent or isolated from the patient by physical and social barriers, the removal of
which may be impossibly costly.171 It is not clear that such decisions can be made
consensually absent ongoing, effective patient/physician dialogue.172 But here we have
described both a significant lever for increased demand for PAS (if not outright coercion)
within a suspect class and a significant barrier to the sort of dialog that might mitigate such
demand and that is, not incidentally, necessary to proper consent.
Of course, even the most ardent advocates of PAS do not argue that physicians should
legally (or otherwise) be allowed to accede to requests for assisted suicide when more
traditional treatment modalities would obviate the need for such requests; that is, when the
requests are borne solely—or even substantially—of inadequate delivery of available and
presently lawful medical care. That would indeed be inexpensive, and in some crude sense
cost-justified, but neither Posner nor any other serious advocate of PAS sees that substitution
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as framing a desirable policy initiative. But here we have described a social situation in
which such requests are liable to be numerous, and where complex social and historical
factors stand in the way of parsing those requests from “bona fide” requests for PAS.
Such problems require nothing like conscious or intentional racism. Notice, too, that
the deepest sort of failure that might occur here hinges on aspects of medical care unlikely to
be revealed in standard quality-of-care metrics, as these are typically narrow and outcomebased.173 And where the upshot of various interactive failures is an unwanted and
unnecessary death, it is not clear how standard morbidity and mortality review could
categorically identify bad outcomes—as opposed to the most grossly deficient processes—
after the fact; once we identify assisted suicide as a legitimate procedure, we create a category
of therapy for which death is not necessarily—or even typically—a “bad outcome” subject to
clinical scrutiny or blame.174
As for process, consider the extent to which full and effective informed consent—
problematic even in ideal practice situations, if an acknowledged benchmark of every serious
brief for legalized PAS—is fundamentally compromised by such gaping failures of
communication. Of course, not every doctor/patient encounter will exhibit such failures when
the patient is African-American. And this is so quite independent of the identity of the
physician. But we cannot be sanguine about giving license to PAS where such breakdowns
173
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are liable to be common. As the Court has said, “death is different.”175 And just as special
constitutional concerns are implicated wherever the State wants to take a life,176 and
especially where such decisions impact differentially on members of “suspect classes,” so we
are at least politically bound to subject to special scrutiny any practice whereby the State
would provide legal sanction—and indeed likely direct or indirect funding—for the “private”
taking of lives, where such practices may impact differentially on members of suspect classes.
How do we tally the costs and benefits of Posner’s putative policy initiative at this
stage? The answer is unclear. We do know that Posner gave short shrift to the problem of
verified, volitional election of PAS, despite the overwhelming evidence of cognition-related
difficulties for the largest likely candidate population. A fair accounting would consider at
least two additional sorts of costs: Those imposed in revising Posner’s very obviously
inadequate psychological screening procedures and those imposed by the errors that any such
revision would inevitably fail to avoid. Questions regarding those two sorts of costs are not
unrelated, for questions about the efficiency of any particular screening procedure are, in part,
questions about the costs of any given error rate. Moreover, I have suggested that the cost of
error is confounded in that interpersonal valuations of human lives are inherently problematic,
especially when we seek to balance lives lost versus persons killed. When we consider PAS
and the African American population the calculus is further confounded. For there, we need
to account for, among other things, what is liable to be a higher error rate. And we need to
account for both first- and third-person costs, both ex ante and ex post.
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There is an open and essentially unanalyzed question of how we might possibly fix the
scope of third-party effects here. If we recall a broader distrust of the medical profession
within the African-American community than in the population at large, and if we recall the
broader range of public health problems conceivably implicated by that differential mistrust,
then we might well wonder how to cabin the third-party costs—say, in terms of public health
effects alone—of a largely unwanted legalization of PAS?
The point of all this is not to claim any particular cost to PAS. It is, rather, to
highlight (1) that the costs of PAS would inevitably be greater than Posner has let on; and (2)
that the job of counting—or even constraining the domain of significant factors to be
counted—would inevitably be far more complicated than Posner suggests. That is simply to
say that Posner’s apparently flawed balancing of costs and benefits raises interesting
questions about whether a defensible, rigorous accounting of costs and benefits could be
forthcoming.

VI. Conclusions: Embedded Norms and Transaction Costs
Posner’s analysis of PAS is in some ways fascinating. At the same time, it suffers
from serious flaws. I have argued that his account suffers from both substantive and
methodological problems. I have argued that some of the methodological problems may be
intractable and that they suggest a special problem with certain assumptions underlying risk
management and the valuation of life as it is sometimes practiced in the agencies. There
remains the nontrivial normative question: what to do?
The answer, in briefest form, is nothing. I believe that we ought to be chary of
proposals to legalize PAS in additional states. Perhaps it goes without saying that we ought
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to avoid such a move in federal law. Given the current institutional framework in which
medicine (and public health) is practiced, I believe that further legalization of PAS would be a
mistake. Despite the copious academic literature on the subject and the plaintiffs’ briefs—
and amicus briefs—in the Glucksberg and Quill cases, I have seen no convincing case that
accounts for the salient costs, as well as the putative benefits, of legally sanctioned PAS. For
all its interest, I do not see that Posner’s analysis has fundamentally altered the landscape.
My position is, of course, suggested by my more substantive critique of Posner’s account.
There, I have argued that Posner greatly underestimated the costs associated with legal
sanction for PAS. The informal—if not necessary—implications are that those costs are great
and we ought to avoid implementing Posner’s proposal or generalizing the initiatives of the
Oregon legislature.
Behind this position is the question of what sort of explanation might be adequate; and
the answer is not entirely clear. I have already suggested that implicit in the PAS debate are
questions about risk management that are difficult in general and especially problematic when
applied to consent issues for likely candidates for PAS. Moreover, I think that most extant
arguments for legalization share with Posner’s analysis an under-appreciation for the sort of
sea change in moral norms that legalization would entail. This limitation applies equally to
our most general moral norms against intentional killing and some of the difficult
implementations of those norms we see embedded in contemporary medical practice, as it
deals with difficult questions about treatment at the end of life. In brief, I see inadequate
attention paid to the likely high transaction costs entailed by any attempt to remake such
norms via legislative fiat.
As mirror to the old and indecisive argument over the efficiency of the common law is
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a newer argument regarding the efficiency of social norms. Robert Ellickson, for example,
has suggested that at least certain sorts of norms may tend to maximize social welfare,
whereas Eric Posner has argued that norms are often “likely to be inefficient,” at least in a
sense.177 At the same time, Eric Posner has recognized the difficulty of answering the
question whether norms are efficient (as well as the difficulty of reforming those which may
not be so).178
I have no general theory regarding the efficiency of social norms. Conspicuous here,
however, is that the PAS debate implicates distinctive sorts of norms, including some of our
most generally held—if not wholly universal—principles regarding the value of human life
and the necessary prerequisites to the taking of human life. Moreover, we deal here not with
social norms that—in Ellickson’s sense—float above law’s more formal social constraints.179
Rather, we have a debate over the proper boundary conditions of these norms and the way
that they are reinforced in the law. Even in this restricted domain, real optimization
arguments are liable to be problematic—either too thin to be much more than question
begging or too baroque to be significantly general. Still, I think it plain enough that we have
good preliminary grounds for favoring these norms over many alternatives, and equally good
grounds to set a rather high threshold of proof for candidate replacements. To return to Judge
Posner’s source, J.S. Mill, we have “the whole of human history” to consult regarding the
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implications of various moral rules.180 If that history provides something less than a
definitive proof of welfare maximization, it provides nonetheless strong pre-theoretical
grounds for caution in public rewriting of the sorts of standards at issue in the PAS debate.
My suggestion is this: To first approximation, that subset of social norms consisting of
fundamental moral rules represents an extremely useful set of heuristics for maximizing social
welfare. As such, the criteria for the defeasibility of such norms—the grounds on which we
might reasonably consider suspending or revising them—ought to be especially demanding.
We have a deeply entrenched and nearly universal norm against intentional killing.181
In typical implementations, the norm is defeasible; that is, it is suspended in certain, limited
contexts.182 Suppose we think of that norm as a defeasible heuristic (at the most general level
this is consistent with both sides of the act/rule divide in utilitarianism).183 That is, suppose—
as I think plausible—that our most general rule against intentional killing tends towards
maximizing social welfare but cannot, in universal application, guarantee it. To unpack the
assumption:
1. The rule is indeed a very good rule of thumb;
2. The rule tends to promote the social welfare in its frequency of observation or
application; and
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3. The rule tends to promote the social welfare in its public aspects, in being
predictable in both projection and application (clear, systematic, and forceful).
As corollary to these assumptions I offer:
4. Conditions for suspending the rule—or redrawing its scope—ought to be both
formally and substantively demanding.184
In their deservedly famous Turing Award lecture of 1975, Herb Simon and Allen
Newell described heuristic search thusly: “The solutions to problems are represented as
symbol structures. A physical-symbol system exercises its intelligence in problem-solving by
search—that is, by generating and progressively modifying symbol structures until it
produces a solution structure.”185 For our purposes, two features of heuristic search are
especially salient. First, Newell and Simon intended that intelligent search models meet a
“strong” limitation criterion; that is, they need to recognize the bounds of limited processing
resources in not just a logical or mathematical sense but in a “practical” one.186 Second, they
saw the difficulty of a problem (and “intelligence” or utility of a method of solution) as
resting not so much in the complexity of search involved but in the amount of search “that
would be required if a requisite level of intelligence were not applied.”187

184

Whether one takes this corollary as a first or second-order principle (or both) may hang on commitments to
particular systematic approaches to morality I would hope to leave aside for purposes of this discussion. That is,
the commitment to setting the bar high may be seen either as a principle governing an individual’s adherence to
the more general rule in a particular case or as a principle governing the reform or qualification of that rule more
generally.
185

See Newell & Simon, supra note 183, at X.
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See id.
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Id. Hence their notion of “intelligence without much search.” Id.
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Our conservative fallback to the familiar, if difficult, standards regarding end-of-life
problems surely fulfills the practicality requirement proposed: compared to an unbounded
social welfare analysis—much less an undeveloped cost-benefit analysis—the prohibition
against PAS as a form of killing is at least tractable. Adopting constraint “4,” above, adds the
further benefit of radically reducing the search: to the extent that the rule tends toward
beneficial outcomes, it should be treated as an embedded rule—one defeasible only under
very limited and carefully specified circumstances. To the extent that the rule is thus treated
as an embedded rule, further evaluation and search are simply suspended in the typical case.
That is, a second heuristic (roughly: stop looking) operates at the evaluation and search stages
following the first (just follow the rule), which governs the symbol (solution) generation
heuristic. This is a ubiquitous, if trivial, bounded search strategy.
My position regarding Posner’s under-accounting of the transaction costs in a change in
legal regimes thus depends on a descriptive observation and a normative suggestion. The
descriptive observation is that the relevant norms are in fact deeply embedded in the practice
of medicine and in our larger society. Changing them is thus liable to be expensive because,
in addition to the usual transaction costs associated with changes in legal rules,
implementation of the change is liable to be especially difficult even as the consequences of
such changes may be especially hard to predict.188 My normative suggestion is that this
heightened degree of entrenchment of the norms in question is very likely a good thing:
Prima facie, we ought to respect the entrenchment and utility of the norm itself, and thus any
efforts to affect the operation of the norm via the legal system ought to be efforts to shore it
up rather than tear it down. My suggestion has both a substantive and an epistemic

188

Indeed, to some extent, because the results will be difficult to predict.
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component: justifying a legal attempt to modify the norm requires a significant (as opposed to
marginal) improvement in social welfare and our confidence in the prediction of that margin
needs to be correspondingly high. Observing that no one has met this burden is thus a
positive argument, not a negative one: the right thing to do socially is to maintain the heuristic
and the present legal regime; the right thing to do personally is to refrain from killing.
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